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Abstract
Bayesian implementation concerns decision making problems when agents have incom-
plete information. This paper proposes that the traditional sufficient conditions for Bayesian
implementation shall be amended by virtue of a quantum Bayesian mechanism. In addition,
by using an algorithmic Bayesian mechanism, this amendment holds in the macro world.
More importantly, we find that the revelation principle is not always right by using the
quantum and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms.
Key words: Quantum game theory; Mechanism design; Bayesian implementation;
Revelation principle.
1 Introduction
Mechanism design is an important branch of economics. Compared with game the-
ory, it concerns a reverse question: given some desirable outcomes, can we design
a game that produces them? Nash implementation and Bayesian implementation
are two key topics of the mechanism design theory. The former assumes complete
information among the agents, whereas the latter concerns incomplete information.
Maskin [1] provided an almost complete characterization of social choice rules that
are Nash implementable when the number of agents is at least three. Postlewaite
and Schmeidler [2], Palfrey and Srivastava [3], and Jackson [4] together constructed
a framework for Bayesian implementation.
In 2011, Wu [5] claimed that the sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
shall be amended by virtue of a quantum mechanism. Furthermore, this amendment
holds in the macro world by virtue of an algorithmic mechanism [6]. Given these
∗ Wan-Dou-Miao Research Lab, Suite 1002, 790 WuYi Road, Shanghai, 200051, China.
Email addresses: hywch@mail.xjtu.edu.cn, Tel: 86-18621753457 (Haoyang
Wu).
accomplishments in the field of Nash implementation, this paper aims to investigate
what will happen if the quantum mechanism is applied to Bayesian implementation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 recalls preliminaries of
Bayesian implementation given by Serrano [7]. In Section 3, a novel condition,
multi-Bayesian monotonicity, is defined. Section 4 and 5 are the main parts of this
paper, in which we will propose quantum and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms
respectively, and claim that the revelation principle for Bayesian Nash equilibrium
is not always right. Section 6 draws the conclusions.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, · · · , n} be a finite set of agents with n ≥ 2, A = {a1, · · · , ak} be a finite
set of social outcomes. Let Ti be the finite set of agent i’s types, and the private
information possessed by agent i is denoted as ti ∈ Ti. We refer to a profile of types
t = (t1, · · · , tn) as a state. Consider environments in which the state t = (t1, · · · , tn)
is not common knowledge among the n agents. We denote by T the set of states
compatible with an environment, i.e., a set of states that is common knowledge
among the agents. Let T =
∏
i∈N Ti. Each agent i ∈ N knows his type ti ∈ Ti, but
not necessarily the types of the others. We will use the notation t−i to denote (t j) j,i.
Similarly, T−i =
∏
j,i T j.
Each agent has a prior belief, probability distribution, qi defined on T . We make
an assumption of nonredundant types: for every i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti, there exists
t−i ∈ T−i such that qi(t) > 0. For each i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti, the conditional probability
of t−i ∈ T−i, given ti, is the posterior belief of type ti and it is denoted qi(t−i|ti).
Given agent i’s state ti and utility function ui(·, t) : ∆ × T 7→ R, the conditional
expected utility of agent i of type ti corresponding to a social choice function (SCF)
f : T 7→ ∆ is defined as:
Ui( f |ti) ≡
∑
t′−i∈T−i
qi(t′−i|ti)ui( f (t′−i, ti), (t′−i, ti)).
An environment with incomplete information is a list E =< N, A, (ui,Ti, qi)i∈N >.
An environment is economic if, as part of the social outcomes, there exists a private
good (e.g., money) over which all agents have a strictly positive preference. For
simplicity, we shall consider only single-valued rules, i.e., an SCF f is a mapping
f : T 7→ A. Let F denote the set of SCFs. Two SCFs f and h are equivalent ( f ≈ h)
if f (t) = h(t) for every t ∈ T .
Consider a mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g) imposed on an incomplete information envi-
ronment E, g : M 7→ F . A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Γ is a profile of strategies
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σ∗ = (σ∗i )i∈N where σ
∗
i : Ti 7→ Mi such that for all i ∈ N and for all ti ∈ Ti,
Ui(g(σ∗)|ti) ≥ Ui(g(σ∗−i, σ′i)|ti), ∀σ′i : Ti 7→ Mi.
Denote by B(Γ) the set of Bayesian equilibria of the mechanism Γ. Let g(B(Γ))
be the corresponding set of equilibrium outcomes. An SCF f is Bayesian imple-
mentable if there exists a mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g) such that g(B(Γ)) ≈ f . An
SCF f is incentive compatible if truth-telling is a Bayesian equilibrium of the direct
mechanism associated with f , i.e., if for every i ∈ N and for every ti ∈ Ti,
∑
t′−i∈T−i
qi(t′−i|ti)ui( f (t′−i, ti), (t′−i, ti)) ≥
∑
t′−i∈T−i
qi(t′−i|ti)ui( f (t′−i, t′i ), (t′−i, ti)),
∀t′i ∈ Ti. The revelation principle for Bayesian Nash equilibrium (P884, [8]): Sup-
pose that there exists a mechanism that implements an SCF f in Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, then f is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Consider a strategy in a direct mechanism for agent i, i.e., a mapping αi = (αi(ti))ti∈Ti :
Ti 7→ Ti. A deception α = (αi)i∈N is a collection of such mappings where at least
one differs from the identity mapping. Given an SCF f and a deception α, let [ f ◦α]
denote the following SCF: [ f ◦ α](t) = f (α(t)) for every t ∈ T . For a type ti ∈ Ti,
an SCF f , and a deception α, let fαi(ti)(t
′) = f (t′−i, αi(ti)) for all t
′ ∈ T . An SCF f is
Bayesian monotonic if for any deception α, whenever f ◦ α 0 f , there exist i ∈ N,
ti ∈ Ti, and an SCF y such that
Ui(y ◦ α|ti) > Ui( f ◦ α|ti), while Ui( f |t′i ) ≥ Ui(yαi(ti)|t′i ), ∀t′i ∈ Ti. (*).
In economic environments, the sufficient and necessary conditions for full Bayesian
implementation are incentive compatibility and Bayesian monotonicity. To facili-
tate the following discussion, here we cite the Bayesian mechanism (page 404, line
4, [7]) as follows: Consider a mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g), where Mi = Ti×F ×Z+,
and Z+ is the set of nonnegative integers. Each agent is asked to report his type ti,
an SCF fi and a nonnegative integer zi, i.e., mi = (ti, fi, zi). The outcome function g
is as follows:
(i) If for all i ∈ N, mi = (ti, f , 0), then g(m) = f (t), where t = (t1, · · · , tn).
(ii) If for all j , i, m j = (t j, f , 0) and mi = (t′i , y, zi) , (t
′
i , f , 0), we can have two
cases:
(a) If for all ti, Ui(yt′i |ti) ≤ Ui( f |ti), then g(m) = y(t′i , t−i);
(b) Otherwise, g(m) = f (t′i , t−i).
(iii) In all other cases, the total endowment of the economy is awarded to the agent
of smallest index among those who announce the largest integer.
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3 Multi-Bayesian monotonicity
Definition 1: An SCF f is multi-Bayesian monotonic if there exist a deception α,
f ◦ α 0 f , and a set of agents Nα = {i1, i2, · · · } ⊆ N, 2 ≤ |Nα| ≤ n, such that for
every i ∈ Nα, there exist ti ∈ Ti and an SCF yi ∈ F that satisfy:
Ui(yi ◦ α|ti) > Ui( f ◦ α|ti), while Ui( f |t′i ) ≥ Ui(yiαi(ti)|t′i ), ∀t′i ∈ Ti. (**).
Let l = |Nα|. Without loss of generality, let these l agents be the last l agents among
n agents.
In 1993, Matsushima [9] claimed that Bayesian monotonicity is a very weak condi-
tion when utility functions are quasi-linear and lotteries are available. Consider an
SCF f that satisfies Bayesian monononicity, if there is a deception α such that its
corresponding agent i has another symmetric agent j (i.e., i , j, ui = u j, Ti = T j,
the prior belief and posterior belief hold by them are the same), then f is multi-
Bayesian monotonic.
Proposition 1: In economic environments, consider an SCF f that is incentive com-
patible and Bayesian monotonic, if f is multi-Bayesian monotonic, then f ◦ α is
not Bayesian implementable by using the traditional Bayesian mechanism, where
α is specified in the definition of multi-Bayesian monotonicity.
Proof: According to Serrano’s proof (page 404, line 33, [7]), all equilibrium strate-
gies fall under rule (i), i.e., f is unanimously announced and all agents announce
the integer 0. Consider the deception α specified in the definition of multi-Bayesian
monotonicity. At first sight, if every agent i ∈ N submits (αi(ti), f , 0), then f ◦ α
may be generated as the equilibrium outcome by rule (i). However, For each agent
i ∈ Nα, he has incentives to unilaterally deviate from (αi(ti), f , 0) to (αi(ti), yi, 0)
in order to obtain yi ◦ α by rule (ii.a). This is a profitable deviation for each agent
i ∈ Nα. Therefore, f ◦ α is not Bayesian implementable.
Note: Since all agents are self-interested and act non-cooperatively, every agent
i ∈ Nα will submit (αi(ti), yi, 0). Actually, rule (iii) instead of rule (ii.a) will be trig-
gered. The final outcome will be uncertain according to the integer game specified
in rule (iii). 
4 A quantum Bayesian mechanism
Following Ref. [5], here we will propose a quantum Bayesian mechanism to modify
the sufficient conditions for Bayesian implementation. According to Eq (4) in Ref.
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[10], two-parameter quantum strategies are drawn from the set:
ωˆ(θ, φ) ≡
eiφ cos(θ/2) i sin(θ/2)i sin(θ/2) e−iφ cos(θ/2)
 , (1)
Ωˆ ≡ {ωˆ(θ, φ) : θ ∈ [0, pi], φ ∈ [0, pi/2]}, Jˆ ≡ cos(γ/2)Iˆ⊗n + i sin(γ/2)σˆx⊗n, where
γ ∈ [0, pi/2] is an entanglement measure, and Iˆ ≡ ωˆ(0, 0), Dˆn ≡ ωˆ(pi, pi/n), Cˆn ≡
ωˆ(0, pi/n).
Without loss of generality, we assume that:
1) Each agent i has a quantum coin i (qubit) and a classical card i. The basis vectors
|C〉 = (1, 0)T , |D〉 = (0, 1)T of a quantum coin denote head up and tail up respec-
tively.
2) Each agent i independently performs a local unitary operation on his/her own
quantum coin. The set of agent i’s operation is Ωˆi = Ωˆ. A strategic operation cho-
sen by agent i is denoted as ωˆi ∈ Ωˆi. If ωˆi = Iˆ, then ωˆi(|C〉) = |C〉, ωˆi(|D〉) = |D〉; If
ωˆi = Dˆn, then ωˆi(|C〉) = |D〉, ωˆi(|D〉) = |C〉. Iˆ denotes “Not flip”, Dˆn denotes “Flip”.
3) The two sides of a card are denoted as Side 0 and Side 1. The message written on
the Side 0 (or Side 1) of card i is denoted as card(i, 0) (or card(i, 1)). A typical card
written by agent i is described as ci = (card(i, 0), card(i, 1)). card(i, 0), card(i, 1) ∈
Ti × F × Z+. The set of ci is denoted as Ci.
4) There is a device that can measure the state of n coins and send messages to the
designer.
A quantum Bayesian mechanism ΓQB = ((Σˆi)i∈N , gˆ) describes a strategy set Σˆi = {σˆi :
Ti 7→ Ωˆi ×Ci} for each agent i and an outcome function gˆ : ⊗i∈NΩˆi ×∏i∈N Ci 7→ F .
A strategy profile is σˆ = (σˆi, σˆ−i), where σˆ−i : T−i 7→ ⊗ j,iΩˆ j×∏ j,i C j. A Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of ΓQB is a strategy profile σˆ
∗ = (σˆ∗1, · · · , σˆ∗n) such that for every
i ∈ N and for every ti ∈ Ti,
Ui(gˆ(σˆ∗)|ti) ≥ Ui(gˆ(σˆ∗−i, σˆ′i)|ti), ∀σˆ′i : Ti 7→ Ωˆi ×Ci.
The setup of the quantum Bayesian mechanism ΓQB = ((Σˆi)i∈N , gˆ) is depicted in Fig.
1. The working steps of ΓQB are given as follows:
Step 1: Nature selects a state t ∈ T and assigns t to the agents. Each agent i knows
ti and qi(t−i|ti). The state of each quantum coin is set as |C〉. The initial state of the
n quantum coins is |ψ0〉 = |C · · ·CC〉︸      ︷︷      ︸
n
.
Step 2: If f is multi-Bayesian monotonic, then go to Step 4.
Step 3: Each agent i sets ci = ((ti, fi, zi), (ti, fi, zi)), ωˆi = Iˆ. Go to Step 7.
Step 4: Each agent i sets ci = ((αi(ti), f , 0), (ti, fi, zi)) (where α is specified in the
definition of multi-Bayesian monotonicity). Let n quantum coins be entangled by
Jˆ. |ψ1〉 = Jˆ|ψ0〉.
Step 5: Each agent i independently performs a local unitary operation ωˆi on his/her
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own quantum coin. |ψ2〉 = [ωˆ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ωˆn]Jˆ|ψ0〉.
Step 6: Let n quantum coins be disentangled by Jˆ+. |ψ3〉 = Jˆ+[ωˆ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ωˆn]Jˆ|ψ0〉.
Step 7: The device measures the state of n quantum coins and sends card(i, 0) (or
card(i, 1)) as mi to the designer if the state of quantum coin i is |C〉 (or |D〉).
Step 8: The designer receives the overall message m = (m1, · · · ,mn) and let the
final outcome gˆ(σˆ) = g(m) using rules (i)-(iii) specified in the traditional Bayesian
mechanism. END.
Given n ≥ 3 agents, consider the payoff to the nth agent, we denote by $C···CC
the expected payoff when all agents choose Iˆ (the corresponding collapsed state is
|C · · ·CC〉︸      ︷︷      ︸
n
), and denote by $C···CD the expected payoff when the nth agent chooses
Dˆn and the first n−1 agents choose Iˆ (the corresponding collapsed state is |C · · ·C︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
D〉).
$D···DD and $D···DC are defined similarly.
Definition 2: Given an SCF f satisfying multi-Bayesian monotonicity, define con-
dition λB as follows:
1) λB1 : Consider the payoff to the nth agent, $C···CC > $D···DD, i.e., he/she prefers the
expected payoff of a certain outcome (generated by rule (i)) to the expected payoff
of an uncertain outcome (generated by rule (iii)).
2) λB2 : Consider the payoff to the nth agent, $C···CC > $C···CD[1 − sin2 γ sin2(pi/l)] +
$D···DC sin2 γ sin2(pi/l).
Proposition 2: In economic environments, consider an SCF f that is incentive com-
patible and Bayesian monotonic, if f is multi-Bayesian monotonic and condition λB
is satisfied, then f is not Bayesian implementable by using the quantum Bayesian
mechanism, and the revelation principle for Bayesian Nash equilibrium does not
hold.
Proof: Since f is multi-Bayesian monotonic, then there exist a deception α, f ◦α 0
f , and 2 ≤ l ≤ n agents that satisfy Eq (**), i.e., for each agent i ∈ Nα, there exist
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ti ∈ Ti and an SCF yi ∈ F such that:
Ui(yi ◦ α|ti) > Ui( f ◦ α|ti), while Ui( f |t′i ) ≥ Ui(yiαi(ti)|t′i ), ∀t′i ∈ Ti.
Hence, the quantum Bayesian mechanism will enter Step 4. Each agent i ∈ N
sets ci = ((αi(ti), f , 0), (ti, fi, zi)). Let c = (c1, · · · , cn). Since condition λB is satis-
fied, then similar to the proof of Proposition 2 in Ref. [5], if the n agents choose
σˆ∗ = (ωˆ∗, c), where ωˆ∗ = (Iˆ, · · · , Iˆ︸  ︷︷  ︸
n−l
, Cˆl, · · · , Cˆl︸      ︷︷      ︸
l
), then σˆ∗ ∈ B(ΓQB ). In Step 7, the cor-
responding collapsed state of n quantum coins is |C · · ·CC〉︸      ︷︷      ︸
n
. Hence, for each agent
i ∈ N, mi = (αi(ti), f , 0). In Step 8, gˆ(σˆ∗) = f ◦ α 0 f .
Therefore, f is not Bayesian implementable and f ◦ α is implemented by ΓQB in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Note that f ◦ α is not incentive compatible (since f is
incentive compatible), the revelation principle for Bayesian Nash equilibrium does
not hold. 
5 An algorithmic Bayesian mechanism
Following Ref. [6], in this section we will propose an algorithmic Bayesian mech-
anism to help agents benefit from the quantum Bayesian mechanism in the macro
world. In the beginning, we cite matrix representations of quantum states from Ref.
[6].
5.1 Matrix representations of quantum states
In quantum mechanics, a quantum state can be described as a vector. For a two-
level system, there are two basis vectors: (1, 0)T and (0, 1)T . In the beginning, we
define:
|C〉 =
10
 , Iˆ =
1 00 1
 , σˆx =
0 11 0
 , |ψ0〉 = |C · · ·CC〉︸      ︷︷      ︸
n
=

1
0
· · ·
0

2n×1
(2)
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Jˆ = cos(γ/2)Iˆ⊗n + i sin(γ/2)σˆ⊗nx (3)
=

cos(γ/2) i sin(γ/2)
· · · · · ·
cos(γ/2) i sin(γ/2)
i sin(γ/2) cos(γ/2)
· · · · · ·
i sin(γ/2) cos(γ/2)

2n×2n
(4)
For γ = pi/2,
Jˆpi/2 =
1√
2

1 i
· · · · · ·
1 i
i 1
· · · · · ·
i 1

2n×2n
, Jˆ+pi/2 =
1√
2

1 −i
· · · · · ·
1 −i
−i 1
· · · · · ·
−i 1

2n×2n
(5)
5.2 An algorithm that simulates the quantum operations and measurements
Similar to Ref. [6], in the following we will propose an algorithm that simulates
the quantum operations and measurements in Steps 4-7 of the quantum Bayesian
mechanism given in Section 4. The inputs and outputs are adjusted to the case of
Bayesian implementation. The factor γ is also set as its maximum pi/2. For n agents,
the inputs and outputs of the algorithm are illustrated in Fig. 2. The Matlab program
is given in Fig. 3, which is cited from Ref. [6].
Inputs:
1) θi, φi, i = 1, · · · , n: the parameters of agent i’s local operation ωˆi, θi ∈ [0, pi], φi ∈
[0, pi/2].
2) card(i, 0), card(i, 1), i = 1, · · · , n: the information written on the two sides of
agent i’s card, where card(i, 0), card(i, 1) ∈ Ti × F × Z+.
Outputs:
mi, i = 1, · · · , n: the agent i’s message that is sent to the designer, mi ∈ Ti ×F ×Z+.
Procedures of the algorithm:
Step 1: Reading parameters θi and φi from each agent i ∈ N (See Fig. 3(a)).
Step 2: Computing the leftmost and rightmost columns of ωˆ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ωˆn (See Fig.
8
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Fig. 2. The inputs and outputs of the algorithm. 
3(b)).
Step 3: Computing the vector representation of |ψ2〉 = [ωˆ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ωˆn]Jˆpi/2|ψ0〉.
Step 4: Computing the vector representation of |ψ3〉 = Jˆ+pi/2|ψ2〉.
Step 5: Computing the probability distribution 〈ψ3|ψ3〉 (See Fig. 3(c)).
Step 6: Randomly choosing a “collapsed” state from the set of all 2n possible states
{|C · · ·CC〉︸      ︷︷      ︸
n
, · · · , |D · · ·DD〉︸      ︷︷      ︸
n
} according to the probability distribution 〈ψ3|ψ3〉.
Step 7: For each i ∈ N, the algorithm sends card(i, 0) (or card(i, 1)) as a message
mi to the designer if the i-th basis vector of the “collapsed” state is |C〉 (or |D〉) (See
Fig. 3(d)).
5.3 An algorithmic version of the quantum Bayesian mechanism
In the quantum Bayesian mechanism ΓQB = ((Σˆi)i∈N , gˆ), the key parts are quantum
operations and measurements, which are restricted by current experimental tech-
nologies. In Section 5.2, these parts are replaced by an algorithm which can be
easily run in a computer. Consequently, the quantum Bayesian mechanism ΓQB =
((Σˆi)i∈N , gˆ) shall be updated to an algorithmic Bayesian mechanism Γ˜
Q
B = ((Σ˜i)i∈N , g˜),
which describes a strategy set Σ˜i = {σ˜i : Ti 7→ [0, pi]× [0, pi/2]×Ci} for each agent i
and an outcome function g˜ : [0, pi]n × [0, pi/2]n ×∏i∈N Ci → F . A strategy profile is
σ˜ = (σ˜i, σ˜−i), where σ˜−i : T−i 7→ [0, pi]n−1 × [0, pi/2]n−1 ×∏ j,i C j. A Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of Γ˜QB is a strategy profile σ˜
∗ = (σ˜∗1, · · · , σ˜∗n) such that for any agent
i ∈ N and for all ti ∈ Ti,
Ui(˜g(σ˜∗)|ti) ≥ Ui(˜g(σ˜∗−i, σ˜′i)|ti), ∀σ˜′i : Ti 7→ [0, pi] × [0, pi/2] ×Ci.
Since the factor γ is set as its maximum pi/2 in the algorithmic Bayesian mech-
anism, the condition λB shall be updated as λBpi/2. λBpi/21 is the same as λ
B
1 ; λ
Bpi/2
2
is revised as: Consider the payoff to the nth agent, $C···CC > $C···CD cos2(pi/l) +
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$D···DC sin2(pi/l).
Working steps of the algorithmic Bayesian mechanism Γ˜QB :
Step 1: Given an SCF f , if f is multi-Bayesian monotonic, go to Step 3.
Step 2: Each agent i sends (ti, fi, zi) as the message mi to the designer. Go to Step 5.
Step 3: Each agent i sets card(i, 0) = (αi(ti), f , 0) and card(i, 1) = (ti, fi, zi) (where
α is specified in the definition of multi-Bayesian monotonicity), then submits θi, φi,
card(i, 0) and card(i, 1) to the algorithm.
Step 4: The algorithm runs in a computer and outputs messages m1, · · · ,mn to the
designer.
Step 5: The designer receives the overall message m = (m1, · · · ,mn) and let the
final outcome be g(m) using rules (i)-(iii) of the traditional Bayesian mechanism.
END.
5.4 New results for Bayesian implementation and revelation principle
Proposition 3: In economic environments, given an SCF f that is incentive com-
patible and Bayesian monotonic:
1) If f is multi-Bayesian monotonic and condition λBpi/2 is satisfied, then f is not
Bayesian implementable by using the algorithmic Bayesian mechanism, and the
revelation principle for Bayesian Nash equilibrium does not hold.
2) If f is not multi-Bayesian monotonic, then f is Bayesian implementable.
Proof: 1) Since f is multi-Bayesian monotonic, then Γ˜QB enters Step 3.
Each agent i sets ci = (card(i, 0), card(i, 1)) = ((αi(ti), f , 0), (ti, fi, zi)), and sub-
mits θi, φi, card(i, 0) and card(i, 1) to the algorithm. Since condition λBpi/2 is satis-
fied, then similar to the proof of Proposition 1 in Ref. [6], if the n agents choose
σ˜∗ = (σ˜∗i )i∈N , where for 1 ≤ i ≤ (n−l), σ˜∗i : Ti 7→ {0}×{0}×Ci; for (n−l+1) ≤ i ≤ n,
σ˜∗i : Ti 7→ {0} × {pi/l} × Ci, then σ˜∗ ∈ B(˜ΓQB )). In Step 6 of the algorithm, the
corresponding “collapsed” state is |C · · ·CC〉︸      ︷︷      ︸
n
. Hence, in Step 7 of the algorithm,
mi = card(i, 0) = (αi(ti), f , 0) for each agent i ∈ N. Finally, in Step 5 of Γ˜QB ,
g˜(σ˜∗) = g(m) = f ◦ α 0 f .
Therefore, f is not Bayesian implementable and f ◦ α is implemented by Γ˜QB in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Note that f ◦ α is not incentive compatible (since f is
incentive compatible), the revelation principle for Bayesian Nash equilibrium does
not hold.
2) If f is not multi-Bayesian monotonic, then Γ˜QB is reduced to the traditional
Bayesian mechanism. Since the SCF f is incentive compatible and Bayesian mono-
tonic, then it is Bayesian implementable. 
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6 Conclusions
This paper follows the series of papers on quantum mechanism [5,6], and gen-
eralizes the quantum and algorithmic mechanisms in Refs. [5,6] to Bayesian im-
plementation. It can be seen that for n agents, the time complexity of quantum
and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms are O(n) and O(2n) respectively. Although
current experimental technologies restrict the quantum Bayesian mechanism to be
commercially available, for small-scale cases (e.g., less than 20 agents [6]), the
algorithmic Bayesian mechanism can help agents benefit from quantum Bayesian
mechanism just in the macro world. More importantly, the revelation principle may
not hold by using the quantum and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms. Since the
revelation principle has been widely applied to many fields such as auction, con-
tract, the theory of incentives and so on, there are many works to do in the future to
generalize the quantum and algorithmic mechanisms.
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start_time = cputime
% n: the number of agents. For example, suppose there are 3 agents. N={1, 2, 3}.
% Suppose the SCF is incentive compatible, Bayesian monotonic and
%      multi-Bayesian monotonic.     ={1, 2}. 
n=3;
% gamma: the coefficient of entanglement. Here we simply set gamma to its maximum        .
gamma=pi/2;
% Defining the array of     and                      .
theta=zeros(n,1);
phi=zeros(n,1);
% Reading agent 1’s parameters. For example,
theta(1)=0;
phi(1)=pi/2;
% Reading agent 2's parameters. For example, 
theta(2)=0;
phi(2)=pi/2;
% Reading agent 3’s parameters. For example, 
theta(3)=0;
phi(3)=0;
)2/,0(ˆˆˆ 21 piωω == C
)2/,0(ˆˆˆ 22 piωω == C
)0,0(ˆˆˆ 3 ωω == I
i
θ ni
i
,,1, L=φ
Fig. 3 (a). Reading each agent i s parameters     and                     .
i
θ ni
i
,,1, L=φ
α
N
2/pi
2=l
Fig. 3 (b). Computing the leftmost and rightmost columns of
% Defining two 2*2 matrices
A=zeros(2,2);
B=zeros(2,2);
% In the beginning, A represents the local operation of agent 1. (See Eq (1))
A(1,1)=exp(i*phi(1))*cos(theta(1)/2);
A(1,2)=i*sin(theta(1)/2);
A(2,1)=A(1,2);
A(2,2)=exp(-i*phi(1))*cos(theta(1)/2);
row_A=2;
% Computing 
for agent=2 : n
% B varies from to
B(1,1)=exp(i*phi(agent))*cos(theta(agent)/2);
B(1,2)=i*sin(theta(agent)/2);
B(2,1)=B(1,2);
B(2,2)=exp(-i*phi(agent))*cos(theta(agent)/2);
% Computing the leftmost and rightmost columns of C= A ⊗ B
C=zeros(row_A*2, 2);
for row=1 : row_A
C((row-1)*2+1, 1) = A(row,1) * B(1,1);
C((row-1)*2+2, 1) = A(row,1) * B(2,1);
C((row-1)*2+1, 2) = A(row,2) * B(1,2);
C((row-1)*2+2, 2) = A(row,2) * B(2,2);
end
A=C;
row_A = 2 * row_A;
end
% Now the matrix A contains the leftmost and rightmost columns of
1ωˆ
n
ωω ˆˆ1 ⊗⊗L
n
ωω ˆˆ1 ⊗⊗L
n
ωω ˆˆ1 ⊗⊗L
2ωˆ nωˆ
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Fig. 3 (c). Computing       ,      ,           .
% Computing 
psi2=zeros(power(2,n),1);
for row=1 : power(2,n)
psi2(row)=A(row,1)*cos(gamma/2)+A(row,2)*i*sin(gamma/2);
end
% Computing 
psi3=zeros(power(2,n),1);
for row=1 : power(2,n)
psi3(row)=cos(gamma/2)*psi2(row) - i*sin(gamma/2)*psi2(power(2,n)-row+1);
end
% Computing the probability distribution
distribution=psi3.*conj(psi3);
distribution=distribution./sum(distribution);
23
ˆ ψψ += J
012
ˆ]ˆˆ[ ψωωψ J
n
⊗⊗= L
33 ψψ
2ψ 3ψ 33 ψψ
% Randomly choosing a “collapsed” state according to the probability distribution
random_number=rand;
temp=0;
for index=1: power(2,n)
temp = temp + distribution(index);
if temp >= random_number
break;
end
end
% indexstr: a binary representation of the index of the collapsed state
%   ‘0’ stands for      , ‘1’ stands for  
indexstr=dec2bin(index-1);
sizeofindexstr=size(indexstr);
% Defining an array of messages for all agents
message=cell(n,1);
% For each agent          , the algorithm generates the message
for index=1 : n - sizeofindexstr(2)
message{index,1}=strcat('card(',int2str(index),',0)');
end
for index=1 : sizeofindexstr(2)
if indexstr(index)=='0' % Note: ‘0’ stands for  
message{n-sizeofindexstr(2)+index,1}=strcat('card(',int2str(n-sizeofindexstr(2)+index),',0)');
else
message{n-sizeofindexstr(2)+index,1}=strcat('card(',int2str(n-sizeofindexstr(2)+index),',1)');
end
end
% The algorithm sends messages                  to the designer
for index=1:n
disp(message(index));
end
end_time = cputime;
runtime=end_time – start_time
33 ψψ
i
mNi∈
n
mm ,,1 L
C D
C
Fig. 3 (d). Computing all messages                   . nmm ,,1 L
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